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Abstract
We consider a monopolist selling durable goods to consumers with unit demands but
different preferences for quality. The seller can offer items of different quality at the
same time to induce buyers to self-select, as in Mussa-Rosen (1978), but is not artifi-
cially constrained to offer only one such menu. Instead the seller can offer a sequence
of menus over time. In the two-buyer case, the seller finds it optimal to abandon
multi-item menus with their quality distortions and instead induces self-selection in-
tertemporally. In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the finite-horizon game
and the particular equilibrium that we consider in the infinite-horizon game, the mo-
nopolist offers in succession single items of efficient quality. In the continuous-time
limit of the infinite-horizon game (under both complete and incomplete information),
the monopolist approximates the present value of perfect price discrimination. All of
our qualitative results for the two-buyer case continue to hold with an arbitrary, finite
number of buyers of different types in some equilibria of the complete-information,
infinite-horizon game .
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1. Introduction
Consider the seller of a durable good such as a microwave oven. Buyers want at most
one item but differ in their willingness to pay for extra features ("quality"). Since
buyers differ, the seller has an incentive to price discriminate; but he cannot offer an
item to any buyer without making it available to everyone else. To price discriminate,
the seller must induce buyers of one type to purchase a particular item while buyers
of a different type purchase a different item.
In principle, the seller can induce such self-selection in two ways. At any given
time, he can offer items of different quality which will have differing appeal to the
heterogeneous buyers. Alternatively, the seller may be able to induce intertemporal
self-selection since anticipation of his future offers may lead some types of buyers to
purchase a current item while others prefer to wait for something more appealing.
Each of these forms of self-selection has been studied extensively in the literature-
but only in isolation. For example, Coase's conjecture about the unprofitability of
durable-goods monopoly spawned a literature on intertemporal self-selection; but
since the monopolist in this literature offers items of only a single quality, he cannot
induce self-selection at a point in time.' Mussa and Rosen (1978), on the other hand,
examine self-selection at a point in time; but by constraining their monopolist to
offer only a single menu of items, they eliminate the possibility of intertemporal
self-selection.2
In reality, a seller of durable goods has the opportunity to induce both forms of self-
selection. Whether he utilizes one form exclusively or the two forms in combination
depends in principle on their relative merits.
We consider here the problem of a durable-goods monopolist who can make a
sequence of offers to two heterogeneous buyers with unit demands. However, our
complete-information, infinite-horizon results hold for any finite number of buyers.
If both buyers remain in the final period of our finite-horizon game, the equilibrium
is identical to what Mussa-Rosen describe: in the absence of a corner solution, the
monopolist finds it optimal to offer a menu of items to induce self-selection. The
optimal menu necessarily contains items of inefficient quality and fails to extract the
entire surplus.
In every period prior to the last, however, the monopolist finds it optimal to
abandon menus. Instead, he offers a single item of efficient quality based on his
observation or-in the absence of direct observation-his beliefs about the marginal
valuations of the remaining buyers.
Inducing self-selection over time turns out in the models we investigate to dom-
inate inducing self-selection at a point in time. The monopolist offers a single item
of a particular quality for sale and replaces it with an item of a different quality if
and only if a sale occurs. Although the next item offered is more attractive to the
previous purchaser than the item he actually purchased, that buyer is nonetheless
rational to purchase the previous item. For he anticipates that the seller would not
have made the subsequent item available until the previous item was purchased. By
utilizing intertemporal self-selection-instead of point-in-time self-selection-the mo-
nopolist avoids having to distort the quality of the second item in order to make
it unattractive to the first buyer; instead, he makes the second item unavailable (to
either buyer) until the prior item is purchased.
The benefit of using intertemporal self-selection is that the monopolist can dis-
pense with sales of inefficient quality. The cost is that he must space out his sales
rather than make them at the same time. However, this cost becomes arbitrarily
small if the interval between offers can be made sufficiently short. As long as the
time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small, the monopolist offers only
one item at a time and does not distort quality.
In this case, the monopolist increases the present value of his profits relative to
Mussa-Rosen's single-offer case. In the continuous-time limit, the monopolist ap-
proximates the present value of perfect price discrimination if the time-horizon is
sufficiently long.
These results differ so markedly from the received wisdom on second-degree price
discrimination that readers may wonder whether they are artifacts of some assumption
about the time-horizon or information structure. For this reason, we also consider
infinite-horizon games where the monopolist can make an unlimited number of offers
in succession and has either complete or incomplete information about the marginal
valuation of a particular buyer. Even in those cases, the equilibria which we consider
have the same characteristics: no multi-item offers, no quality distortions, and-in
the continuous-time limit-the present value of perfect price discrimination.
In section 2, we review Mussa-Rosen's single-offer case, which is also the two-buyer
subgame in the final period of our finite-horizon model. In section 3, we examine the
multi-offer, complete-information game with a finite or unbounded horizon. Section 4
extends our infinite-horizon results to incomplete information and section 5 contains
some concluding remarks. s~
The points we emphasize here continue to hold in complete-information, infinite-
horizon games with arbitrary, finite numbers of buyers of each of a finite number of
types. In the appendix of this paper we show that in any such game there always
exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist offers a sequence of
single-item menus and obtains a present value that approaches the profit obtained
by a perfectly discriminating monopolist in the continuous-time limit. Moreover, the
strategies used by each player in this equilibrium are virtually identical to the ones
we discuss in section 3.
2. The Optimal Single Offer of Prices and Qual-
ities
In this section, we review the optimal policy developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
for a monopolist who sells a good to buyers who value quality differently. We also
establish notation which will be useful in the following section.
In Mussa and Rosen's model, the monopolist is restricted to making a single offer
to the buyers. An offer specifies a menu of items, with each item fully characterized
by its quality level and price. Each buyer is free to select any item from the menu.
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Buyers are assumed to have unit demands; hence, each will select at most one item
from the menu. For simplicity, we review the two-buyer case.
We regard the problem as a two-stage, single-period game. In the first stage,
the monopolist makes an offer taking into account that in the second stage buyers
will simultaneously respond optimally to it. If buyer a (for a = 1,2) pays pa, to
purchase an item of quality q0 , then the buyer's utility payoff is Uie = vaq, - pa,
where vi > v2 > 0. A buyer who chooses not to purchase an item receives a utility of
zero.
The buyers' marginal valuations for quality, v1 and v2, are assumed to be common
knowledge. We assume further that the monopolist is either unable to identify which
marginal valuation belongs to which buyer or, alternatively, that although he has this
information he is barred legally from using it to offer an item to one type of buyer
which is unavailable to the other type.3
When buyer a pays pc, to purchase an item of quality q«, the payoff to the mo-
nopolist is (pi - c(q,)) + (p2 - c(q2)), where c(q) is the constant marginal cost (with
respect to volume) of a unit with quality q. We adopt Mussa and Rosen's assumptions
that c'(q), c"(q) > 0 for all q. We also assume that c(0) = 0 and that v2 > c'(0) .4
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game described above, it is optimal for
the monopolist to adopt the following strategy.
The monopolist offers (p1 , q1) and (p2, q2) in order to:
If the monopolist's offer is optimal, at least one of the two participation constraints
must bind. For if neither were binding, the monopolist could raise the two prices on
the qualities offered by a small, common amount and still satisfy the participation
constraints. Equation (2) indicates that as long as the difference in the two prices
in the new program is unchanged, each self-selection constraint would also still hold.
Hence the new program would still be feasible and would result in higher profits.
In equilibrium, buyer 2 will never be the only buyer to purchase. For any item
(with q2 > 0) which gives him nonnegative utility would produce strictly positive
utility for buyer 1, and he would also purchase. There are therefore only two possi-
bilities: sell to both buyers or sell to buyer 1. These correspond, respectively, to the
interior (pa > 0 and q, > 0 for a = 1 and a = 2) and corner solutions (p2 = 0 and
q2 = 0) of the monopolist's constrained optimization problem.
Since buyer 1 receives positive untility from any item that provides buyer 2 with
positive utility, buyer l's participation constraint cannot bind if buyer 2's partici-
pation constraint is not binding. Since at least one of the participation constraints
must bind, the seller always extracts all of the surplus from buyer 2, equation (c)
holds with equality, and, hence, P2 = v 2q2. The self-selection constraint of buyer I
must also bind. For if it did not, then the monopolist could increase pi while leav-
ing his other decision variables unchanged. This would generate a feasible but more
profitable offer.
By solving the binding constraints (equations (ic) and (id)) for p, and p2 and
substituting the resulting expressions in equation (la), we obtain a strictly concave
objective function in qi and q2 which is maximized subject only to the nonnegativity
constraints for q, and q2. Solving the resulting optimization problem, we obtain
for q1: vi - c'(q1) = 0. As for q2, there are two possibilities: Either q2 > 0 and
2v2 - V1- c'(q2) = 0 or, alternatively, q2 = 0 and 2v2 - vi - c'(0) < 0 .5
If 2v2 - vI - c'(0) > 0, then it is optimal for the monopolist to sell to both buyers.
Let (p" ,qR) denote the item purchased by a type a buyer in this case. Denote the
inverse of the marginal cost by f(v) = c'-(v). The optimal offer for the Mussa-Rosen
monopolist is to set:
max (pi - c(q1)) - (p2 - c(q2))
subject to the constraints:
pa, q > 0 fora= 1,2
viqi - pi > 0
v2q2 - p2 > 0
vig 1 - pi > v192 - p2






The optimal strategy for each buyer in the second stage is to choose the best
item offered in the first stage that generates nonnegative utility. The constraints (1b)
through (le) indicate how the buyers' strategies restrict the monopolist's equilibrium
offers. Equations (lb) and (1c) are "participation" constraints indicating that buyers
will only purchase items which generate nonnegative utility. Equations (ld) and (le)
are "self-selection" constraints. Equation (ld) states that (pi, qi), the item intended
for buyer 1, will only be purchased by buyer 1 if it generates utility for him that is
at least as high as the utility generated by the alternative item. Equation (le) has a
similar interpretation for buyer 2.
It is straightforward to verify that the optimization problem specified by equations
(la) through (le) has a unique solution.
The two self-selection constraints can be re-written as follows:
qua = f(vi)
9MR = f(2v2 -vi)






It will be convenient to define the following additional variables for the case where
the monopolist sells to both buyers: wMn uVMR, and UjR.
Let A.MR denote the profit the monopolist derives from the type a buyer when
both types buy as specified in equations (3a) through (3d):
MR u unM
rMR =p, c(qc, ) (4)
Let VMR denote the sum of the payoffs which the monopolist collects from the
buyers in this case:
vi(qi - q2) > PI- P2 > v2(qi- q2) . (2) V MR = -MR + .MR (5)
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Let U, R denote the equilibrium payoff of buyer a in this case. That is, U2MR =
2MR --M2R " 0 and UMR = vigMR - MR
If instead 2v2 -i- c'(0) <0, then a corner optimum occurs. In this circumstance,
it is optimal for the Mussa-Rosen monopolist to offer only a single item which only
buyer 1 accepts: q2 = P2 = 0 and qi = f(v1), pi = vgg.
In discussing the case of the Mussa-Rosen monopolist, it is useful to keep in
mind the benchmark of perfect or first-degree price discrimination. Recall that a
perfectly discriminating monopolist can offer an item on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to
each buyer in isolation-that is, he can offer an item to one buyer while making it
unavailable to the other buyer. Therefore his objective function is the same as (la)
but he is restricted only by the two participation constraints (1b and 1c)-and not
by either self-selection constraint. The profit obtained from each type a buyer will
be vaga - c(qa). The optimal item for such a monopolist to offer to a type a buyer
has a price and quality level denoted by (pat, qa8t) and specified by the equations:
1st - lit
Pa = vaggi ,
91t = f(va) .
(6a)
(6b)
Note that since the monopolist can extract all of the surplus from each buyer, he
offers each the "efficient" quality level (the level which maximizes total surplus).
It will be convenient to define the following additional variable for the case of
perfect price discrimination. Let r' denote the profit that the monopolist obtains
when a type a buyer accepts the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer specified in equations
(6a) and (6b).
rIse = pt -c(gat) . (7)
Equations (3a) and (6b) indicate that buyer 1, who has the higher marginal val-
uation for quality, always receives the same quality level from the Mussa-Rosen mo-
nopolist as he would from a perfectly discriminating monopolist. This is true whether
or not the Mussa-Rosen monopolist chooses to sell to buyer 2. On the other hand,
equations (3b) and (6b) indicate that buyer 2, with a lower marginal valuation for
quality, receives a quality level that is always less than the efficient level for buyer 2.
(Buyer 2 receives either qR < q2'' or makes no purchase.)
The equilibrium in the Mussa-Rosen, single-period game also has the following
features. The lower valuation buyer, never obtains positive surplus. When it is
optimal to sell only to buyer 1, then that buyer also receives only zero utility. However,
when the monopolist sells to both buyers, then the higher valuation buyer receives
strictly positive utility (U1 ' > 0).
The Mussa-Rosen monopolist is unable to achieve the profits of the perfectly-
discriminating monopolist even when it is optimal to serve both customers (VMR <
list + 4 t). The offer of the perfectly discriminating monopolist must therefore violate
one or more of the four constraints of the Mussa-Rosen monopolist. It must satisfy
the two participation constraints and it happens to satisfy buyer 2's self-selection
constraint. However, it violates the self-selection constraint of buyer 1.
Figure 1 summarizes the results. The qualities offered by the monopolist are mea-
sured along the horizontal axis, and the prices charged for each quality are measured
along the vertical axis. Since buyers prefer higher quality and lower prices, indiffer-
ence curves are positively sloped; points southeast of a given indifference curve are
strictly preferred to points on the curve.
Given our assumptions, each indifference curve for the type a buyer is linear with
slope vm. The steeper upward-sloping line labeled U1 = 0 and the flatter upward-
sloping line labeled U2 = 0 indicate the combinations of price and quality that pro-
vide zero utility for buyer 1 and buyer 2 respectively. The optimal offer of a perfectly
discriminating monopolist to buyer 1 occurs at the intersection of the vertical line
labeled gist and the line U1 = 0. Similarly, the optimal offer that a perfectly discrim-
inating monopolist would make to buyer 2 occurs at the intersection of the vertical
line q = q'' and the line U2 = 0.
The dilemma of Mussa-Rosen's monopolist is the following. He cannot offer an
item to one buyer which is unavailable to the other. But if he were to offer simulta-
neously the two items sold separately by a perfect price discriminator, buyer 1 would
strictly prefer (p28t, q2") to the alternative item (p1,q gia) since the former item would
give him a strictly positive surplus. Since any item (with q2 > 0) yielding zero surplus
to buyer 2 will yield strictly positive surplus to buyer 1, the Mussa-Rosen monopolist
cannot offer items to each simultaneously which extract all of their surplus.
As we have seen, the best that a monopolist can do if constrained to make every
item offered available to both buyers is either to offer two items (the interior case) or
to offer a single item (the corner case). In the interior case, the two items would both
generate the same positive surplus (U,"') for buyer 1 and therefore must lie on the
same indifference curve (as illustrated by the dashed line in figured). The quality of
the higher quality item would be efficient (qi
t) but the quality of the lower quality
item-although strictly positive-would be below the efficient level (qMR < q'). The
corner case occurs when the dashed line coincides with buyer 1's indifference curve
through the origin. Given buyer l's self-selection constraint, the best single offer the
monopolist can devise contains either two items and earns VMR or contains one item
and earns s ". Both of these payoffs are strictly smaller than 7rit + i4'", the profits
of perfect price discrimination.
But as we shall illustrate in the next section, even if the monopolist must make
each item available to all buyers his difficulties can be alleviated provided he may
make multiple offers. Indeed, if offers can be made in sufficiently rapid succession,
the monopolist can often approximate the profits of perfect price discrimination. The
next section exposits these results for the case of two buyers. The appendix of our
paper generalizes the results to the case of a complete-information, infinite-horizon
game where there are initially a finite number of buyers of each of a finite number of
types.
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3. Optimal Sequential Offers
In this section, we consider the gains which the monopolist can achieve by making
a sequence of offers to the two buyers instead of a single offer. Making a sequence
of offers is advantageous because it induces buyers of different types to purchase in
different periods. For discount factors sufficiently close to one, we will show that the
monopolist can always increase the present value of his profits by making a succession
of single-item offers-each based on his observation or beliefs about the marginal
valuations of the remaining buyers. In the continuous-time limit of the infinite-
horizon game, the monopolist can approximate the profits of a perfectly discriminating
monopolist.
We model the problem as a multi-period game, with the periods indexed by t =
1,2... T. As in the previous section, there are two stages in each period. In the first
stage, the monopolist makes an offer consisting of a menu of items, with each item
fully characterized by its quality level and price. In the second stage, each buyer
simultaneously chooses whether to select a single item from among those offered or
to continue to the next period. Buyers are assumed to have unit demands and select
at most one item during the course of the game. Since the monopolist makes an offer
in each period, the horizon, T, corresponds to the maximum number of distinct offers
that the monopolist can make during the game. When T is infinite, the number of
offers that the monopolist can make is unbounded. In each game analyzed in this
section there are only two buyers each of whom makes at most one purchase during
the game; hence, the monopolist sells at most two units of the good no matter what
we assume about the horizon length.
If buyer a purchases an item of quality qQ in period to and pays price pa, then he
obtains the utility (discounted to t = 1):
monopolist does not observe the marginal valuation of a buyer who accepts an offer,
he tries to infer but cannot observe the marginal valuation of the remaining buyer.
A player's strategy in each period specifies his action in that period as a function
of time and anything else that he can observe - for example, the sequence of previ-
ous offers, the number of buyers purchasing specific price-quality pairs, the periods
in which various items were purchased, the marginal valuations of the buyers who
purchased each item, and, for the buyers, the menu of prices and qualities offered in
the first stage of the current period. The monopolist's strategy in each period spec-
ifies his offer in the first stage of the period as a function of these things. Similarly,
a buyer's strategy specifies which price-quality pair (if any) to accept in the second
stage of each period. The monopolist chooses his strategy to maximize the present
value of his profits. Each buyer chooses a strategy to maximize his own utility.
3.1. Equilibrium in Complete-Information Games
We now consider both finite- and infinite-horizon games with complete informa-
tion. We consider in turn the two parameter regimes which gave rise in Mussa-Rosen's
single-offer case, respectively, to corner and interior equilibria: 2v2 - VI - c'(0) 0
and 2v2 - VI - c'(0) > 0. In each case, we begin by describing the subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies for each of the three players. Having described them, we then
verify that each strategy is optimal in every subgame given the other strategies.
In the regime where 2v2 - V1- c'(0) < 0, the buyers use the following strategy
in each period. In the current period t, each buyer accepts the best offer (if any)
of those which generate nonnegative utility for him. We refer to this strategy as the
"get-it-while-you-can" strategy since the buyer seizes the first opportunity for surplus
as if no future opportunities might present themselves. s~
The monopolist uses the following strategy in period t. If buyer 1 or both buy-
ers remain in the game at the beginning of the period, then the monopolist offers
the single price-quality pair (pi't, qi' t ) defined by equations (6a) and (6b). If only
buyer 2 remains, then the monopolist offers the single price-quality pair (p1'
t , gnt).
Using the above strategy, the monopolist "eats his way down" the distribution of
buyers' marginal valuations for quality, extracting the surplus in each period from
the remaining buyer with the highest marginal valuation for quality. We refer to the
monopolist's strategy as the "Pacman strategy."
Next, we verify that these strategies are subgame perfect. In both finite- and
infinite-horizon games, no buyer can ever obtain positive utility when the monopolist
uses the Pacman strategy. Hence, it is optimal for each buyer to use the get-it-while-
you-can strategy in each period.
Finally, we verify the optimality of the seller's strategy when buyers use the get-
it-while-you-can strategy in each period. In any period with only one remaining
buyer, the Pacman strategy is clearly optimal for the monopolist since it extracts the
maximum possible surplus from this buyer.
Suppose instead that both buyers remain. Any price-quality pair (with q > 0)
that generates nonnegative utility for buyer 2 generates strictly positive utility for
buyer 1. Hence, it is infeasible-given the buyers' strategies-for the monopolist
to sell only to buyer 2. This leaves the monopolist two choices: sell immediately
U_ 8/t*-1(vq. -Pa,)I (8)
where # is a discount factor assumed to be the same for all players and va is a positive
constant. We assume that 1 > Q > 0 and that v1 > v2 > 0. A buyer who chooses not
to purchase in any period receives a utility of zero.
If buyer 1 accepts (pm, q1) in period tm and buyer 2 accepts (p2, q2) in t2, then the
present value received by the monopolist is:
V = #-1 (p - c(qi)) + # 2 1 (P2 - c(q2)) (9)
If only the single buyer a purchases during the game (in period t), then the mo-
nopolist receives #'-i-(p, - c(q0)), and if neither buyer makes a purchase then the
monopolist receives zero. As in the previous section, we assume that c'(q), c"(q) > 0
for all q, that c(0) = 0, and that v2 > C'(0).
The marginal valuations for quality, v1 and v2, are assumed to be common knowl-
edge. Throughout section 3, we assume the monopolist has complete information and
knows the type (marginal valuation) of each specific buyer.
In section 4, we assume instead that the monopolist has incomplete information
and does not know which marginal valuation belongs to which buyer. When the
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to both buyers or sell only to buyer 1. Among all the offers which only buyer 1
would accept, the Pacman offer is clearly optimal for the monopolist since it extracts
the maximum possible surplus from buyer 1. Moreover, the analysis in the previous
section indicates that this profit strictly exceeds the profit from selling simultaneously
to the two buyers.
Indeed, if at least one future period remains the Pacman strategy is even more
profitable than in the single-offer case since the opportunity to make future offers
enables the seller to extract the entire surplus of buyer 2 in the next period. Hence,
the Pacman strategy results in the following present value for the monopolist:
will offer the single quality gI't at a price p(t) which is given by the equation:
P(t) = (1 - jr-t), a + ~3 Ttp.MR (11)
V= flat + 3r 
t
(10)
The above arguments demonstrate that when 2v2 - v1 - c'(0) < 0, the use of
the Pacman strategy by the monopolist and the get-it-while-you-can strategy by
each buyer constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the complete-information
game with any horizon length, either finite or infinite. Moreover, these strategies
constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any discount factor between zero and
one. In any game in which the monopolist can make two or more offers (T > 2),
the monopolist receives the equilibrium present value specified in equation (10). This
strictly dominates the profit obtained by a static Mussa-Rosen strategy.
We now consider the regime where 2v2 - v1 - c'(0) > 0. Since we are ultimately
interested in the play of the game when the time interval between successive offers
becomes negligible, we focus on the equilibrium strategies when the discount factor
pertaining to the interval between offers approaches one.
For discount factors sufficiently close to one, the subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategies in the finite-horizon game may be described as follows. Buyer 2 uses the
get-it-while-you-can strategy in each period. Buyer 1 uses the get-it-while-you-can
strategy in any subgame where he is the sole remaining buyer. In addition, buyer 1
always uses the get-it-while-you-can strategy in the final period of the game (t = T)
whether or not buyer 2 remains. Finally, if both buyers remain prior to T, buyer 1
uses the get-it-while-you-can strategy in the current period whenever he anticipates
being the only remaining buyer from the next period onward; buyer 1 will anticipate
being isolated if he observes that some item currently offered by the monopolist will
provide nonnegative utility for buyer 2.
If both buyers remain prior to T and if buyer 1 observes that no item offered will
yield nonnegative utility to buyer 2, then buyer 1 is more selective: in the current
period t he will accept the best price-quality pair (if any) of those that generate
utility (discounted to period 1) greater than or equal to the reservation utility (also
discounted to period 1) #T1UUMR.6 Buyer l's strategy in this case is a generalization
of the get-it-while-you-can strategy; we refer to it as the "generalized get-it-while-
you-can strategy with discounted reservation utility #T-1U 1fR."
As for the description of the seller's strategy, he will use the Pacman strategy
defined in the previous section in any period where only one buyer remains. If both
buyers remain in the final period, the monopolist will make the Mussa-Rosen offer
specified in equations (3a) - (3d). If both buyers remain prior to T, the monopolist
In equilibrium, buyer 1 accepts (p(1), q'') in the first period and buyer 2 accepts
(pl' t, q't) in the second period.
To verify that these strategies are subgame perfect, note first that the get-it-while-
you-can strategy is optimal for buyer 2 since he can never obtain positive utility
when the monopolist uses his equilibrium strategy. For the same reason, the get-it-
while-you-can strategy is optimal for buyer 1 when he is the sole remaining buyer.
Since a failure to accept an offer in the final period results in zero utility, the get-it-
while-you-can strategy is also optimal for buyer 1 in the final period whether or not
buyer 2 remains. Finally, if the monopolist offers a price-quality pair that provides
nonnegative utility for buyer 2, then buyer 2, using the get-it-while-you-can strategy,
will accept it; buyer 1 can therefore expect only zero utility in future periods, and
the get-it-while-you-can strategy is also optimal for him in this case.
If both buyers remain prior to T and the monopolist offers no item in period t
which gives buyer 2 nonnegative utility, then buyer 1 anticipates that buyer 2 will
remain and that the seller will offer qi
t in the next period at a price of p(t + 1)
defined in equation (11). For all t + 1 < T, equation (11) implies that p(t + 1) >
,uR. Hence, the analysis of the single-offer game in the previous section implies that
buyer 2 will reject such an offer. More generally, buyer 1 can anticipate that as long
as he declines to purchase, the monopolist will continue to offer (p(s), qi't) in any
period t < s < T and that buyer 2 will continue to reject these offers. Moreover,
by substituting equations (6a) and (11) into equation (8) and using the fact that
UMR - p - f", it is straightforward to verify that buyer I obtains the same
discounted utility, T-1UfIR, by accepting any of the offers (p(s), q'').
Finally, suppose that buyer 1 declines to purchase until the final period. In this
case, he can anticipate that as his final act the monopolist would offer the Mussa-
Rosen menu and that buyer 1 would again earn the discounted utility 3T'1 U by
accepting an item from this menu. Hence, in any future period including the last,
the buyer expects to obtain the discounted utility #T-1URf if he fails to accept the
monopolist's offer in period t when both buyers remain. It is thus optimal for buyer
1 to accept the best offer in period i of those that provide discounted utility greater
than or equal to 3T1UMdR; that is, it is optimal for buyer 1 to use the generalized
get-it-while-you-can-strategy with discounted reservation utility #T~'UI"R.
To complete the verification of subgame perfection, we consider the optimality of
the seller's strategy. As in the other parameter regime, the Pacman strategy is clearly
optimal for the monopolist in any subgame with one remaining buyer since it extracts
the maximum possible surplus from such a buyer.
If two buyers remain in the final period, then the game from that point onward
is identical to the single-period game analyzed in section 2. Hence, the Mussa-Rosen
strategy described in equations (3a) - (3d) is clearly optimal for the monopolist in
the final period when both buyers remain.
If two buyers remain prior to the final period, the monopolist again has two
choices: sell immediately to both buyers or sell only to buyer 1. It is infeasible to sell
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only to buyer 2, since any item (with q > 0) giving him nonnegative utility would
give buyer 1 strictly positive utility; hence, buyer 1 would purchase either that item
or some more attractive alternative and sales to both buyers would have occurred.
We now verify that, for sufficiently high discount factors, the seller will never make
an offer containing two items prior to the final period. To sell simultaneously to both
buyers, the monopolist must provide buyer 2 with nonnegative utility. But this will
make buyer 1 anticipate isolation and he too will accept the best offer generating
nonnegative utility. The analysis in the previous section demonstrates that when
both buyers require nonnegative utility to participate and 2v2 -v - c'(0) > 0, the
static Mussa-Rosen offer is the most profitable two-item offer for the seller and results
in a payoff of irM2R+4 R.
The monopolist can easily dominate this best two-item offer provided he can
make at least one future offer (that is, if t < T). For, suppose the monopolist simply
deleted the lower quality item from the Mussa-Rosen offer. Buyer 2 will not accept
the remaining item since it provides him with negative utility (as it did when it
was part of the Mussa-Rosen menu). On the other hand, buyer 1 can obtain the
discounted utility of #'~lU("R by accepting the remaining item in period t. Since
#t1UMR " > I-31UMR, buyer 1-using his equilibrium strategy-would purchase the
item. Hence, the monopolist can anticipate that buyer 1 will accept the offer and
buyer 2 will reject it. The seller could then offer (p", "q) next period and, since
it would provide buyer 2 with nonnegative utility, could anticipate that the offer
would be accepted. This strategy yields the seller ir"R +/9w''. For # > #* where
#* = vMR/ 1at this payoff strictly exceeds the payoff from the two-item Mussa-Rosen
offer.
Of course, this strategy-while superior to any two-item menu-is not the best
single-item offer. Recall that in any period t prior to the last period (t < T), if both
buyers remain and buyer 1 does not anticipate that buyer 2 will make a purchase in
period t, then buyer 1 will accept the best offer yielding discounted utility #T-1U MR.
The monopolist should therefore continue to offer qit since that maximizes the total
surplus; but he should price it so as to extract all but the minimum surplus necessary
for buyer 1 to purchase. The price of the proposed dominating offer (pMR) is subopti-
mal since it gives UtMR to buyer 1 when he requires, in terms of period t utility, only
#9T-' UMR. The optimal price should therefore be p(t) = pfMR+ (UMR - '3TtUMR).
Using the fact that UM"R = pl''_- p", we conclude that the optimal price for the
item of quality qi'8 is given by equation (11).
The above discussion demonstrates that the proposed strategies constitute a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the two-buyer, finite-horizon game with complete information
for any / > #*. In equilibrium, the monopolist sells a unit of quality qi' t to buyer 1
in the first period at a price given by p(l) in equation (11) and makes the offer (pI t ,
gqa) to buyer 2 in the second period. Substituting these prices and qualities into
equation (9) and collecting terms using equations (4) and (7), we obtain the following
expression for the equilibrium present value obtained by the monopolist in the play
of the T-period game:
For infinite-horizon games with complete information and sufficiently high /3, the
analysis when 2v2 - vi - c'(0) > 0 is virtually identical to the analysis for the previous
parameter regime. In the infinite-horizon game,- the use in each period of the get-
it-while-you-can strategy by each buyer and the Pacman strategy by the monopolist
constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium present value obtained
by the monopolist, VP, is given by equation (10).
As in the previous parameter regime, the get-it-while-you-can strategy is optimal
for each buyer since the buyers can anticipate only zero utility in future periods.
The Pacman strategy is optimal for the monopolist if VP > VMR. A comparison
of equations (5) and (10) indicates that VP > VMR if /9> * .7 In the play of the
equilibrium, the monopolist makes the offer (pi', q
t ) in the first period and receives
the equilibrium present value, VP, given in equation (10).
It can be verified by working backwards that whenever the horizon is finite the
subgame-perfect equilibrium is essentially unique.
8 In contrast, there are a continuum
of equilibria in the infinite-horizon case. The particular infinite-horizon equilibrium
we discussed was chosen because the strategies supporting it are the limiting strategies
in the finite-horizon case for a sufficiently long horizon. Buyer 2 in either case accepts
the best offer in a period yielding nonnegative utility. Buyer 1 in the infinite-horizon
case also accepts such offers and in the finite-horizon case adopts the identical strategy
prior to T except when two buyers remain and no current item would give buyer 2
nonnegative utility. In such circumstances, buyer 1 purchases the best item offered
provided it yields #9-1UtIR. But this strategy becomes virtually the same as "get-
it-while-you-can" as T becomes large. Recall that when the monopolist is restricted
to a maximum of T offers, he makes the offer (p(1), q') in the first period, with
p(l) given in equation (11), and obtains the equilibrium presen.value, VT, given in
equation (12). For each fixed value of #3 greater than #*, equations (10), (11), and
(12) indicate that the monopolist's first-period offer and present value in the T-period
game approach the infinite-horizon first-period offer, (pi", qi
t ), and the present value
obtained in the infinite-horizon game as T becomes large. (p(1) -+ pi- and VT --+VP
asT-4oo.)
We conclude this subsection by putting the multi-offer case in the context of figure
1. In the parameter regime where 2v2 - vi - c'(0) > 0, the monopolist finds it optimal
to make single-item offers (prior to any final period) as long as the discount factor is
sufficiently high. The heavy dots in figure 1 represent the offers made to buyers 1 and
2 in the play of the multi-offer game with two buyers. The offer purchased by buyer 1
in the first period lies above the dashed indifference curve of buyer 1 and so provides
lower utility for him than he receives in the single-offer game studied by Mussa and
Rosen. In the second period, buyer 2 accepts the offer that he would receive from a
perfectly discriminating monopolist.
Since this second offer lies below the self-selection constraint for buyer 1, buyer 1
would prefer to receive the offer accepted by buyer 2 rather than the offer which buyer
1 actually accepts. Why, then, does buyer 1 accept the inferior offer rather than wait
for something better? Buyer 1 accepts the inferior offer because he anticipates that
as long as he waits the monopolist would decline to offer anything better. This is
not an "incredible threat" by the monopolist but instead his optimal behavior in theVT = (1 - /9T-1)ri't + #9T-17 MR + #9st . (12)
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remainder of the game as long as both buyers remain.
3.2. The Continuous-Time Limit
One way to relate the periods in our game to calendar time is to assume that a
fixed, finite interval of calendar time, 6, must elapse between successive offers. If it
is also assumed that there is a maximum amount of time, r, after which the game
must end, then T, the maximum number of offers which the monopolist can make, is
related to the time horizon, P, via the equation:
is r, 2v2 - v1 - c'(0) > 0, and #> #*'.
P(1) = (1 - e-°[r' ~)pi't + e-[r-s prR (15)
T = (13)
If the game has an infinite time horizon, then there is no apriori bound on the maxi-
mum number of offers; that is, T = oo.
If p is a fixed parameter expressing the common instantaneous rate of time pref-
erence of the buyers and the monopolist, then fl, the discount factor for the time
interval between successive offers is related to p and 6 via the equation:
/3 = exp[-p6]. (14)
Using the above formulation, we can define a continuous-time limit to our game
by allowing the interval between successive offers 6 to approach zero. In this case, al-
though the discount factor for any fixed time interval (e.g. one year) remains constant,
# must approach one.
In the infinite-horizon game, the monopolist obtains the present value VP in both
parameter regimes. As the time between successive offers shrinks to zero, the mo-
nopolist receives a present value equal to that obtained by a perfectly discriminating
monopolist, ir? + r4'.
In finite-horizon games (with T > 2), the monopolist also receives the present
value VP when 2v2 - v1 - c'(0) < 0. Hence, in the continuous-time limit, he also
receives the present value obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
For the parameter regime 2v2 - VI - c'(0) > 0, however, the monopolist cannot
in the continuous-time limit achieve the present value attainable under perfect price
discrimination when the horizon length is fixed. For, in that case, buyer 1 can always
hold out for the monopolist's final offer and be assured a strictly positive surplus.
To analyze the behavior of the initial price and the monopolist's present value
of profit in this parameter regime as a function of the fixed time horizon and the
interval between offers, we proceed as follows. As the interval between successive
offers (6) shrinks, 3 strictly increases while the threshold level #* remains constant.
Thus, for any fixed time horizon ', deviating from the static Mussa-Rosen strategy
becomes optimal for the monopolist if the time interval between offers is sufficiently
short. The monopolist then receives the present value VT specified in equation (12).
By using equations (13) and (14) to substitute for T and /3 in equations (11) and
(12), we can rewrite the equations for p(1), the price at which the monopolist sells to
buyer 1 in the first period, and for VT in terms of the "time parameters" 6, F, and p.
Let Vr denote the present value obtained by the monopolist when the time horizon
Vr = (1 - e-,[Pr-I),rt + e~P~F6 1 AMR + e-''" . (16)
It is straightforward to set 6 = 0 in equations (15) and (16) to determine the
limiting expressions for p(l) and r as the interval between offers shrinks to zero. For
a finite time horizon, F, p(1) < pt' and Vr < V", even when 6 = 0.
However, for any fixed 6 (and for the limiting case where 6 = 0), p(l) - pid
and Vr -+ VP as P - oo. When the time horizon becomes large, the monopolist in
the finite-horizon game uses almost the same strategy in the first period and obtains
almost the same present value as in the infinite-horizon game. Moreover, as 6 -+ 0 and
1 -+ oo, p(1) -4 pi'' and Vr -+ writ + '. As the interval between successive offers
becomes small and the time horizon becomes large, the monopolist makes the same
offers and receives the same present value as the perfectly discriminating monopolist.
4. Extension to Incomplete Information
In the previous section, we assumed that the monopolist could observe the marginal
valuation of each buyer but was barred from utilizing this information to make an offer
to one buyer which was unavailable to a buyer with a different marginal valuation.
Suppose instead that the monopolist knows only the initial distribution of the buy-
ers' marginal valuations but does not know the marginal valuation of any particular
buyer. Limited information would then prevent the monopolist from offering an item
to one buyer which was unavailable to a buyer with a different 'harginal valuation
even if such discrimination were permitted.
In the single-offer case of Mussa-Rosen, this change in information structure does
not alter the analysis. But as we shall see, it does affect the analysis in our multi-
offer case. Nevertheless, the infinite-horizon example in this section demonstrates that
the novel results which we have ascribed to relaxing Mussa-Rosen's assumption of a
single offer do not depend on the assumption of complete information. Our example
shows that the traditional results (the optimality of two-item offers, the inefficiency
of the lower quality item, etc.) do not necessarily return in the multi-offer case once
incomplete information is introduced.
To solve our game of incomplete information, we convert it to a game of imper-
fect information in the standard way. We introduce an initial, chance move which
determines which particular buyer has the higher valuation
9 and examine a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game.'"
As in the complete information case, the monopolist offers single items of efficient
quality in the first parameter regime (2v2 - V1 - c'(0) < 0) for any /3 and in the second
parameter regime (2v2 - VI - c'(0) > 0) for any /3> #*. In either circumstance, the
payoff of the monopolist is V'. As before, the present value of this payoff approaches
that achieved under perfect price discrimination in the continuous-time limit.
To describe a "perfect Bayesian equilibrium"(PBE) we must once again specify
the strategy of each of the three players; in addition, however, we must specify the
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beliefs of a given player about the marginal valuation of each buyer when it is that
given player's move.
The PBE solution concept requires that the strategy of each player is optimal from
every information set onward given that player's beliefs and the strategies of the other
players. Moreover, along the equilibrium path, the beliefs must be consistent with
the equilibrium strategies of the players and Bayes rule.
In the game that we consider, it is common knowledge that one buyer has marginal
valuation vi and the other buyer has marginal valuation v2. Since each buyer is
assumed to know his own type, each buyer knows with certainty the type of the other
buyer." At the outset, the monopolist assigns probability 1/2 to the event that one
particular buyer has the higher valuation and the other the lower valuation. If a
single buyer accepts an offer, the monopolist is unable to observe the type of that
buyer but revises his belief about the remaining buyer's marginal valuation and acts
optimally given his revised beliefs.
We begin by describing the beliefs of the monopolist following the purchase of
a single item. The seller concludes that buyer 2 remains whenever the single item
purchased would give buyer 2 negative utility; otherwise, he concludes that buyer 1
remains.
Next we describe the equilibrium strategies of each player. When both buyers
remain, each accepts the best item yielding nonnegative utility. Buyer 2 also employs
this get-it-while-you-can strategy if he is the only buyer. If only buyer 1 remains and
the item previously purchased gave buyer 2 nonnegative utility, then buyer 1 accepts
the best item which gives him nonnegative utility. If, however, the item previously
purchased gave buyer 2 negative utility, then buyer 1 accepts the best item yielding
a current utility larger than #[vig'q' -p'a].
The monopolist's equilibrium strategy is as follows. In periods where both buyers
remain, the monopolist offers the single price-quality pair (pl't, qi'') just as he would
do in a game with complete information. In periods where only one buyer remains, the
monopolist offers the price-quality pair (pe'', gi'') if and only if the item previously
purchased would have given buyer 2 negative utility. If it would have given buyer 2
nonnegative utility, then the monopolist offers the remaining buyer (plt, qet). We
refer to the monopolist's equilibrium strategy as the "incomplete-information Pacman
strategy."
It is straightforward to verify the optimality of the monopolist's strategy. Suppose
a single buyer remains. If the item previously purchased would have given buyer 2
negative utility, then the monopolist assesses at one the probability that the remaining
buyer has the lower valuation. Since such a buyer will in equilibrium always use
the get-it-while-you-can strategy, the proposed strategy of offering (plt, qzt) would
extract all of buyer 2's surplus and is clearly optimal for the monopolist.
If, on the other hand, the item previously purchased would have given buyer
2 nonnegative utility, then the monopolist assesses at one the probability that the
remaining buyer has the higher valuation. Since buyer 1 will in equilibrium use
the get-it-while-you-can strategy following a purchase with this characteristic, the
proposed strategy of offering (p81, qist) would extract all of buyer l's surplus and is
clearly optimal for the monopolist.
In any period when two buyers remain, each uses the get-it-while-you-can strategy.
The proof of the optimality of the seller's strategy when two buyers remain is then
identical to the case of complete information both in the first parameter regime for
any /3 and in the second for # > /* . In equilibrium, the monopolist's payoff is again
Vp.
When the monopolist uses the incomplete-information Pacman strategy, buyer
2 can never obtain positive utility in equilibrium; hence, the get-it-while-you-can
strategy is always optimal for him.
Consider the optimality of the strategy for buyer 1. If the best current item for
buyer 2 yields nonnegative utility, buyer 1 anticipates that buyer 2 will purchase and
that the seller will offer the single price-quality pair (pi't, qi"t) repeatedly in the future
until he purchases; it is, therefore, optimal for him to accept the best current item
yielding nonnegative utility. If instead every current item would yield negative utility
for buyer 2, then buyer 1 would anticipate that buyer 2 would remain. Since if buyer
1 also remains, the seller will offer the single price-quality pair (pi't, qgf) repeatedly
until a purchase occurs, the get-it-while-you-can strategy is again optimal for buyer
1.
When buyer 1 is alone, it is clearly also optimal for him to use the get-it-while-
you-can strategy if buyer 2 previously purchased an item yielding nonnegative utility;
for, following that event, the monopolist concludes that buyer 1 remains and repeat-
edly offers the price-quality pair (pi', et) until it is purchased. If, however, buyer
2 previously (in error) purchased an item yielding negative utility, the monopolist
concludes (erroneously) that buyer 2 remains and repeatedly offers the item (pl'',
q' t ) which is tailored to extract all of the surplus from buyer 2. In that case, buyer 1
should accept the best current offer yielding a current utility of at least #3[v 1ql -p2t].
The definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium places some restrictions on the
monopolist's beliefs. On the equilibrium path, the monopolist's belief's must accord
with the consequences of the equilibrium strategies and Bayes' rule.1 2 To verify that
the beliefs are "consistent" in this sense, note that in the first period of equilibrium
play, the monopolist offers the single price-quality pair (pl", qi t ) and buyer 1 accepts
it-precisely as the seller would surmise following such a purchase. This concludes
the demonstration that the strategies and beliefs postulated form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
To summarize, the characteristics of this perfect Bayesian equilibrium are the same
as in the complete information case: the monopolist offers single items of efficient
quality in successive periods and, in the continuous-time limit, approximates the
present value of perfect price discrimination.
We certainly do not contend that this perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unique.
Indeed, by changing the beliefs and strategies off the equilibrium path, a continuum
of other equilibria can be constructed.1 3 Although each of these equilibria happen
to have those characteristics mentioned above, other equilibria may exist which do
not. What we have asserted and now proved is that the introduction of incomplete
information is insufficient to restore the familiar results of the single-offer case.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The literature on second-degree price discrimination has focused on the benefits to
a monopolist of inducing buyers to self-select at a point in time by offering a single
menu of items with different characteristics. As our paper shows, when the monop-
olist is allowed to offer a sequence of menus over time, the opportunity to induce
intertemporal self-selection provides the monopolist with a potent additional means
of extracting surplus. Indeed, in the examples we consider, it is optimal for the mo-
nopolist to abandon multi-item menus altogether and rely solely on intertemporal
self-selection (except perhaps in the last period, if one exists). More generally, we
expect that there will also be cases where it is optimal for the monopolist to utilize
both point-in-time and intertemporal self-selection by offering a sequence of different
multi-item menus over time.
The model in our paper is closely related to the one in Bagnoli et al. (1989)
although our focus there was entirely different. In the previous paper, we assumed
that the monopolist could not alter the quality of the durables he produced. Hence,
every item offered at a point in time had the same price, and inducing point-in-time
self-selection was infeasible. Our focus in that paper was instead on Coase's famous
conjecture that in the continuous-time limit, buyers always receive the entire social
surplus. We showed that this conjecture is false when the number of buyers is finite.
Taken together, our two papers provide a unified theory of durable-goods monopoly.
In the rest of this section we wish to mention two issues common to both papers which
deserve further thought.
The first issue concerns the domain of our two analyses. The structure of demand
in both models is identical. Buyers want at most one unit of a good and demand
nothing further once they have purchased it. This standard assumption is intended to
capture in a stylized way the characteristics of durables (e.g. microwaves). In contrast,
the demand for nondurables (e.g. hamburgers) drops to zero immediately after a
purchase but fully recovers after some time interval. For example, the consumer of
one hamburger at lunchtime today-although temporarily stuffed-might be equally
ready to indulge in a hamburger at lunchtime tomorrow.
Either of our models can be adapted to this nondurable case by regarding it as
a sequence of fixed-horizon durable-goods markets each of which occurs daily. To
illustrate, suppose for simplicity that there will be a finite number of lunches. At the
last lunch, the monopolist would make a sequence of price (or price-quality) offers
to the buyers during the fixed-horizon called lunchtime. Since demand in this final
market has the characteristics of a durable in our models, our results hold and the
equilibrium payoffs (unique in the two-buyer case) will be anticipated by the players
at the penultimate lunchtime. Since strategies at the penultimate lunchtime will
have no effect on the payoffs anticipated at the final lunchtime, these values (properly
discounted) can be added to payoffs at the penultimate stage and our models again can
be used to predict the monopolist's offers and the buyers' responses .... Given this
adaptation of our model, it would seem mistaken to regard our results as applicable
only to durables.
The second issue we wish to raise concerns welfare. In our two papers, we exhibited
a number of examples in which the monopolist extracted all of the surplus in the
continuous-time limit. In such examples, of course, the equilibrium allocation is
efficient. However, there were three situations in which the monopolist extracted
only a portion of the available surplus in the continuous-time limit. Recall from
section 3, for example, that if the Mussa-Rosen menu is optimal in the final period
when both buyers remain, then the buyer with the higher valuation inevitably gets
some of the surplus and this surplus is not negligible even in the continuous-time limit
provided the time horizon is short (see p. 23). Similarly, in the fixed quality case
of the previous paper, the higher valuation buyer gets some surplus in the analogous
circumstance-if the seller would prefer to sell to both buyers in the last period.
Finally, the monopolist fails to extract the entire surplus in the continuous- time
limit in a three buyer example in the fixed quality case.
We find it striking that even in these three examples, whatever surplus the durable-
goods monopolist fails to capture goes to the consumers: there is negligible deadweight
loss in the continuous-time limit!" Moreover, if one accepts the adaptation of our
model to the sale of some nondurables (e.g. hamburgers) as outlined above, then some
nondurable monopolies are also efficient!'" We do not contend that monopoly-even
durable-goods monopoly-inevitably maximizes social surplus. Indeed, we know that
it is possible to construct nonstationary equilibria in games with unbounded horizons
which are inefficient even in the continuous-time limit. However, our two papers have
identified a collection of cases where monopoly is asymptotically efficient. Further
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2. The constraint that the monopolist offer only a single menu is unimportant as
long as the willingness of each buyer to purchase when the next menu would be offered
is independent of whether he purchased in the past. For simplicity, we refer to goods
with this characteristic as "nondurables" and to all other goods as "durables." Note
that, as discussed in the final section, this classification depends on the time interval
of the service flow from a purchased product relative to the time interval between
the seller's offers. In the case of nondurables, it would be optimal for the monopolist
to offer the Mussa-Rosen menu in every period. However, many-including Mussa-
Rosen (1978, p.316) themselves-have applied their model to conventional durables
(e.g. cars). When he sells a durable, constraining the seller to offer only a single
menu turns out to distort his behavior.
3. Each of these distinct information assumptions results in the same equilibrium
in the single-offer case studied by Mussa and Rosen (1978). However, as will be
shown in section 4, they have different implications in the multi-offer case. For if
the seller lacks complete information about a given buyer's marginal valuation, then
his assessment of the valuations of the buyers remaining after some purchases have
occurred may be incorrect.
4. The assumption that v2 > c'(0) is sufficient to insure that both buyers are served
under perfect price discrimination and that at least buyer 1 is served in Mussa-Rosen's
problem.
5. Since by assumption v1 > v2 > c'(0), qe > 0 and there is no need to write
the complementary slackness condition for q. The expression 2v2 -v, - c'(q2) can
be re-written as v2 - [c'(q2) + (v1 - v2)] and given the following interpretation. A
marginal increase in the quality offered buyer 2 increases the surplus the monopolist
can extract from buyer 2 by v2 but results in two types of costs: it increases his
production costs by d(q2) and forces him to reduce his charge to buyer 1 by vi - v2.
At an interior optimum, these marginal benefits and costs balance; at a corner, the
marginal costs are at least as high as the marginal benefits.
6. If an item available in period I has a utility (discounted to period 1) of
#T-URf, its value capitalized to period I is magnified by the factor '1-t: in current
value terms, it is worth #T-tUtR.
7. A comparison of equations (5) and (10) indicates that in order for the Pacman
strategy to be optimal for the monopolist in the infinite-horizon game, it is sufficient
for # to be greater than #**, where
~MR M s
X 1st
8. A trivial multiplicity of equilibria arises because the seller can always add items
to the menu which are unacceptable to every remaining buyer. Even in the absence
of such items, a second trivial multiplicity of equilibria arises because of buyer 2's
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indifference about accepting offers off the equilibrium path yielding zero utility. That
is, in every subgame perfect equilibrium the strategies of the seller and buyer 1 are
unique. Moreover, when buyer 2 alone remains, he must play get-it-while you-can.
However, if both buyers remain it would also be optimal for buyer 2 to reject an offer
yielding zero utility instead of accepting it as he would if he played get-it-while-you-
can. Since when both buyers remain the seller would make an offer acceptable only
to buyer 1, the play of the game and the payoffs which result are the same in both of
these equilibrium strategy combinations.
9. We utilize the Harsanyi transformation because of its familiarity to readers.
In our particular problem, however, an alternative transformation suggests itself.
Suppose the monopolist knew the marginal valuation of each player but could not
observe the identity of the purchaser because, for example, goods are ordered by
electronic mail and must be left for the purchaser in a place the seller cannot observe.
This too is a game of imperfect rather than incomplete information and the strategies
and beliefs we discuss constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game as well.
10. The solution to a game of incomplete information is often defined in terms
of a sequential equilibrium, which is a refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept. However, in our game there is a continuum of price-quality pairs from which
the monopolist constructs his offers and the sequential equilibrium concept is not
defined for such games. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for a discussion of the
concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and its refinements as well as its relationship
to sequential equilibrium.
11. In a game with incomplete information and more than two buyers, a buyer
would not be able to infer the type of every other buyer from a knowledge of the
aggregate distribution of types.
12. Indeed, the beliefs in our equilibrium can be shown to satisfy an additional
restriction which, although not required of perfect Bayesian equilibria, seems sensible.
Starting at any information set off of the equilibrium path and using the beliefs
there as priors, the subsequent beliefs must be consistent with Bayes' rule when the
equilibrium strategies are played.
13. To construct different equilibria, consider the set of price-quality pairs which
would simultaneously give buyer 2 nonnegative utility and buyer 1 at least #[vig' t -
p2SL]. Arbitrarily pick any subset of these items and assume that if the monopolist
observes a single purchase of an element in this subset when two buyers remain that
he believes buyer 2 remains. In all other cases, retain the beliefs described in the text.
Correspondingly, change the strategy of buyer 1 so that when the best current offer
for buyer 2 falls in this subset, buyer 1 accepts the best current item yielding current
utility of at least #[vig3t-p23t]. In all other cases, retain the strategies described in the
text. Then it is straightforward to verify that these new strategies and beliefs form a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (and also satisfy the additional restriction mentioned in
footnote 12). Since there are a continuum of possible subsets which can be designated,
there are a continuum of equilibria. In each, the monopolist offers single items of
efficient quality in successive periods and, in the continuous-time limit, approximates
the present value of perfect price discrimination.
14. Our examples of efficient monopolies also assume that there are at least
as many periods as there are distinct marginal valuations. The single-period game
studied by Mussa-Rosen demonstrates that inefficient outcomes can easily result if
this assumption is not satisfied.
15. It might be thought that the efficiency of the nondurable monopoly in this
adaptation of our model is attributable to the assumption that buyers demand at
most one unit at any given lunchtime. However, as the reader can easily verify, the
identical result holds if the monopolist faces a single buyer with marginal valuation
of v1 for the first unit and v2 for the second unit.
Appendix
This appendix extends our model to the case of an arbitrary, finite initial number of
buyers. For the infinite-horizon game with complete information, we show that the
use of the Pacman strategy by the monopolist and the get-it-while-you-can strategy
by each buyer constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the discount factor
is sufficiently close to one. In this equilibrium, the present value obtained by the
monopolist approaches the profit obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist
as the discount factor approaches one.
The timing of the game is the same as in the text. There are an infinite number
of periods indexed by t = 1,2..., oo. In the first stage of period t, the monopolist
offers a menu M(t) = {(p;(t),qi(t))} which is a finite set of ordered pairs indicating
the quality levels, q;(t), available in period t together with the price, p;(t), of a unit
with a given quality. In period t, let i = 1,... , I(t) and suppose that qi > qj when
i < j. In the second stage of each period, buyers simultaneousl 7 choose whether to
accept an item from the monopolist's menu or continue to the next period. Buyers
choose at most one item during the game.
There are a finite number of distinct buyer types indexed by a = 1,2... A. A
type a buyer who accepts the item (p,(t), q(t)) in period I obtains the utility:
Uo,(p;(t), q,(t)) = #t~ [vaqi(t) - p (t)], (A.l)
where 1 > /9> 0 is a discount factor which is assumed to be the same for all players.
As in the text, we refer to v as the marginal valuation for quality of a type a buyer.
Let v1 > v2 > ... > VA > 0. Buyers who do not accept an offer receive a utility of
zero.
Initially, there are assumed to be a positive, finite number of buyers of each type.
Let nQ(t) denote the number of type a buyers who have not yet purchased a unit of
the monopolist's good at the beginning of period t. No new buyers enter the market
after the game begins; hence, the number of type a buyers who have not yet accepted
an offer remains constant or decreases over time.
As in the text, c(q) denotes the constant marginal cost of producing a unit with
quality level q. We continue to assume that c'(q), c"(q) > 0 for all q, that c(0) = 0,
and that VA > c'(0) .1
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If b(t) denotes the number of buyers accepting itemi in period t, then the present
value, V, of the monopolist's profits is given by the equation:
V = E#- {bi(t)[P(t) - c(qi(t))]}
Pacman strategy is optimal for the monopolist in the infinite-horizon market game
with complete information. For initial sets of buyers that contain only one type of
buyer, let #p = 0. Otherwise, let #p be defined by equation (A.11) below.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium that we consider, the present value obtained
by the monopolist using the Pacman strategy, V", is given by the equation:
(A.2)
We restrict attention to games with complete information where all players can
observe the type of each buyer who accepts an offer. Hence, in particular, the numbers
n,(t) are common knowledge for all t. As in the text, a player's strategy in each
period specifies his action in that period as a function of time and anything else
that he can observe - for example, the sequence of previous offers, the number of
buyers purchasing specific price-quality pairs, the periods in which various items were
purchased, the marginal valuations of the buyers who purchased each item, and, for
the buyers, the menu of prices and qualities offered in the first stage of the current
period. The monopolist's strategy in each period specifies his offer in the first stage
of the period as a function of these things. Similarly, a buyer's strategy specifies
which price-quality pair (if any) to accept in the second stage of each period. The
monopolist chooses his strategy to maximize the present value of his profits. Each
buyer chooses a strategy to maximize his own utility.
We now show that in the infinite-horizon game with complete information, the
following strategies constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the discount factor
is sufficiently close to one. Suppose that in each period t a buyer accepts the best
offer of those which provide him with nonnegative utility. As in the text, we refer to
this strategy for the buyer as the get-it-while-you-can strategy.
Let (p", qgli) denote the take-it-or-leave-it offer specified in equations (6a) and
(6b) of the text which a perfectly discriminating monopolist would make to a type a
buyer. Let a(t) denote the type of the buyer with the highest marginal valuation for
quality, va(t), of all those buyers who have not yet accepted an offer at time t. That is,
in each period t, suppose that nag)(i) > 0, and that na(t) = 0 for all a < a(t). With
this notation, a monopolist who uses the Pacman strategy offers a menu in period t
consisting of the single item: (pjtl, 913t).
The following proposition asserts that the Pacman strategy is optimal for the
monopolist when all buyers use the get-it-while-you-can strategy and the discount
factor is sufficiently close to one. Since no buyer can ever achieve positive utility
when playing against the Pacman strategy, it is clearly optimal for all buyers to
use the get-it-while-you-can strategy in each period when the monopolist uses the
Pacman strategy. It follows as a corollary of these two assertions that the use of the
Pacman strategy by the monopolist and the get-it-while-you-can strategy by each
buyer constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium of our infinite-horizon game. This
corollary, which represents the main result of the appendix, is stated formally at the
end of the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Pacman) If all buyers use the get-it-while-you-can strategy in each
period, then for any initial set of buyers, there exists a discount factor #p with 0 <
/3p < 1 such that for all discount factors satisfying the inequality: 1 > #i> 3p , the
A
VP = E #*~1n.c(1 )r'' ,
a='
(A.3)
where 7ra' is the profit obtained from a type a buyer by a perfectly discriminating
monopolist. An expression for ir; t is specified in equation (7) in the text. Note that
as # approaches one, the monopolist's present value approaches the total surplus, S,
obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
The rest of this appendix is a proof of proposition 1. The proof consists of three
parts. First, we introduce some notation. Next, we show that if a certain inequality
(equation A.7) holds for all /> p', then starting with an arbitrary subgame and any
nonempty set of remaining buyers, the present value obtained from any monopolist's
strategy that generates a pattern of sales different from the pattern obtained by the
Pacman strategy can be strictly improved by replacing the deviant strategy with the
Pacman strategy. Finally we show that the assumed inequality is indeed valid.
Consider the following notation for describing the present value obtained when
various monopoly strategies are applied to a generic subset of buyers who use the
get-it-while-you-can strategy.
Let 1 denote the name of a generic subset of the initial set of buyers. Let A(P)
denote the number of distinct buyer types in r and let na denote the number of type
a buyers in P.
One important benchmark is the present value obtained by a perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist who sells to the buyers in F. To each type a buyer, a perfectly
discriminating monopolist makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer (pia', q,'') and obtains
the surplus, Sr, given by the equation:
A
Sr = Z n~rat
a~=1
(A.4)
Note that na = 0 for buyer types a that are not contained in I'.
A second important benchmark is the supremum of the present value obtained by
a monopolist who cannot make separate take-it-or-leave-it offers to each individual
buyer and who sells to all the buyers in r in a single period. We refer to this present
value as Vru.
A third important benchmark is the present value obtained by a monopolist who
sells to the buyers in 1 using the Pacman strategy. Denote this present value by Vr -2
Now consider the proof of proposition 1.
If the initial set of buyers are all of the same type, then proposition 1 follows
immediately since the Pacman strategy maximizes the surplus obtainable from that
single type of buyer for all values of the discount factor. We set #ip = 0 in this case.
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Henceforth, we restrict attention to initial collections of buyers with two or more
distinct types of buyer.
Now consider an arbitrary, nonempty subset r of the initial set of buyers. We
envision 1' as being the subset of initial buyers who have not yet accepted an offer at
the beginning of an arbitrary subgame and consider an arbitrary monopoly strategy
for selling to the buyers in 1 in this subgame. Since we are at present concerned only
with the optimality of the monopolist's strategy, we need only consider subgarnes
that begin with the monopolist's choice in the first stage of some period.
When all buyers use, the get-it-while-you-can strategy, any offer that causes a type
i buyer to accept some item will also cause all type j buyers with v > v, to accept
some item in the offered menu. Hence, the response of buyers to a general monopoly
strategy involves in each period either i. no sales, ii. sales to all the buyers with the
single highest marginal valuation for quality, or iii. sales to a "clump" of buyers where
a clump consists of all the buyers with marginal valuations for quality (two or more)
higher than some threshold level, v;. We will call the act of selling to a "clump" of
buyers "clumping". The main idea of the proof is that if # > Op, then clumping is
never optimal.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to monopoly strategies that
deviate from the Pacman strategy in the first period of a subgame. For suppose that
some monopoly strategy specifies the use of the Pacman strategy for a number of
periods before deviating. In this case, we need only proceed to the subgame which
begins with the monopolist's first deviation from the Pacman strategy and consider
the subset of buyers remaining at the beginning of that subgame to be our starting
set of buyers P.
If the set P contains buyers of only one type, then replacing a deviant offer by
the Pacman offer strictly improves the monopolist's profits because it increases the
surplus extracted from these buyers and has no other effect. (The game ends after
the single type of buyer accepts the Pacman offer.) Hence, we restrict attention in
what follows to subsets P that contain two or more buyer types.
Now consider a subgame with an arbitrary set of remaining buyers P that contains
two or more types of buyer and an arbitrary monopoly strategy that deviates from
the Pacman strategy in the first period of the subgame.
Suppose first that the initial deviation from the Pacman strategy involves zero
sales in the first period. Since delay is costly, any strategy with zero sales in the
first period can be strictly improved by making the Pacman offer to those buyers in
P with the highest marginal valuation for quality and using the original strategy in
future periods. This replacement advances forward the purchase of the buyers with
the highest marginal valuation and may also increase the surplus obtained from these
buyers. The replacement has no effect on the present value of the surplus obtained
from other buyer types since the get-it-while-you-can strategy is stationary and since
the choices which it specifies for type a buyers are not contingent on the presence or
absence of other buyer types.
Although the set P is assumed to contain more than one type of buyer, suppose
next that the initial deviation involves sales only to the buyers in 1 with the single
highest marginal valuation for quality. In this case, replacing the deviating offer by
the Pacman offer in the current period and offering the same menus as previously
in future periods clearly improves profits. The Pacman offer increases the surplus
obtained from the buyers with the highest marginal valuation for quality while the
present value obtained from the other buyers is not affected.
Suppose finally that the initial deviation involves selling to a "clump" of buyers
with marginal valuations for quality greater than or equal to vi. Let P, c P be the
set of all buyers in r with marginal valuations greater than or equal to vs and let P;
be the set of all buyers in F with marginal valuations less than v. In this case, A(FI)
denotes the number of buyer types in F with marginal valuations for quality greater
than or equal to vi. By hypothesis, A(Pi) > 2.
Let W,_ be the present value of the surplus obtained by making the offers originally
specified by the monopoly strategy to the buyers in FI.. Of course, Fi_ may be empty,
in which case W_ = 0. Since Vi" represents an upper bound on the present value
that can be obtained by selling immediately to all the buyers in Fi, an upper bound
on the present value obtained by the original monopoly strategy (including the first
period "clumping") is:
V(A.5)
The present value obtained by selling first to the buyers in P; using the Pacman
strategy and then making the offers specified by the original monopoly strategy to
the buyers in P;. is given by the expression:
Vr +iA(r)W;. (A.6)
Replacing the first period clumping by the use of the Pacman strategy is optimal
if the present value specified in equation (A.6) exceeds the presept value in equation
(A.5). This condition can be written in the form:
Vr - Vr > #W;-_(1 -#fA(ri)-'l) (A.7)
The term on the left-hand side of equation (A.7) is the difference of the first terms
in equations (A.6) and (A.5). It represents a lower bound on the additional value
obtained by selling to the buyers in I'; using the Pacman strategy rather than the
original deviant strategy. It is proved below in lemma 1 that for all subsets containing
two or more buyer types and all /> f#p, the left-hand side of equation (A.7) is greater
than a strictly positive quantity A/2 which does not depend on the discount factor
The term on the right-hand side of equation (A.7) is the difference of the second
terms in equations (A.5) and (A.6) and represents the cost of selling to the buyers in
I; using the Pacman strategy rather than the original monopoly strategy. This cost
consists of the interest lost by delaying the purchases of the buyers in r=.. For /3> #ip,
the value of the lost interest is sufficiently small that the inequality in equation (A.7)
is satisfied, and it is optimal to replace the initial clumping with the offers specified
by the Pacman strategy.
It is proved below that if /3 > fpp, then the inequality in equation (A.7) is satisfied
for any subset of the initial set of buyers that contains two or more buyer types.
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Subject to the validity of the inequality in equation (A.7), the previous arguments
demonstrate that starting in an arbitrary subgame with an arbitrary set of remaining
buyers who use the get-it-while-you-can strategy, the present value obtained by a
monopolist can be strictly increased by proceeding to the first period in which a
proposed monopoly strategy involves a pattern of sales that deviates from the pattern
induced by the Pacman strategy and replacing this initial deviation with the offers
specified by the Pacman strategy. If the original monopoly strategy deviates in more
than one period from the Pacman strategy, then the modified strategy (with the first
deviation replaced) can be strictly improved by replacing the second deviation by
the Pacman strategy and so on for as many deviations as might be involved in the
original proposed strategy. Since there are only a finite number of buyer types and
each plays get-it-while-you-can, there can be only a finite number of deviations for
the seller and the proposed procedure will terminate in a finite number of steps.
Any proposed monopoly strategy with a pattern of sales that deviates from the
pattern induced by the Pacman strategy can be strictly improved by replacing suc-
cessive deviations with the Pacman strategy. Hence, no departure from the Pacman
strategy can (strictly) improve the present value obtained by the monopolist and the
Pacman strategy must itself be optimal.
This establishes proposition 1 subject to the validity of equation (A.7).
Now consider lemma 1 which provides a lower bound for the left-hand side of
equation (A.7).
Lemma 1 For any subset of the initial set of buyers r that contains two or more
distinct buyer types and any /3 > /p, with #Bp as defined in equation (A.11) below,
Vc , the present value obtained from selling to the buyers in r using the Pacman
strategy, and Vt^", the supremum of the present values obtainable by selling in a
single period to all the buyers in F, satisfy the following inequality:
monopolist to make the offers (pt", gi') and (pp", q)"t) simultaneously and expect
that type i buyers will accept the first offer and type j buyers will accept the second.
Type i buyers will also prefer the second offer, which provides them with strictly
positive rather than zero utility. Hence, a monopolist who wishes to sell to all the
buyers in f in a single period but who cannot make separate take-it-or-leave-it offers
to each buyer type cannot extract all of the type i buyers' surplus, and this implies
that S. >Vf".
Let A denote the minimum of the At as I ranges over all the subsets of the initial
set of buyers that contain two or more distinct buyer types, that is,
A = min L.r (A.10)
The previous discussion implies that A is strictly greater than zero as long as the
initial set of buyers contains two or more types of buyer. Note that A does not
depend on the discount factor.
Finally, consider discount factors, #, that satisfy the following inequality:
1 >/> p= 2S/
(A.11)
where S denotes the surplus obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist who
sells to the initial collection of buyers. Since neither S, A, nor A depend on the
discount factor, /3 is a well-defined number that is strictly between 0 and 1 and has
a value that depends only on the characteristics of the initial collection of buyers.
For any subset r and any ,3 satisfying equation (A.11), we haze the inequalities:
V -VAl > ,
F , i St Ste as i
For any subset I', the definition of the Pacman strategy also implies that:




where A is a strictly positive constant that does not depend on the discount factor
and is defined in equation (A.10) below. It is assumed that the buyers in r use the
get-it-while-you-can strategy in each period.
To prove lemma 1, consider a subset of the initial set of buyers 1' that contains two
or more buyer types. Assume that the buyers use the get-it-while-you-can strategy
in each period.
Define At via the equation:
A monopolist using the Pacman strategy obtains the same surplus from the type a
buyers in I as that obtained by a perfectly discriminating monopolist but discounted-
by a factor that depends on the delay in serving these buyers. Since it never takes
more than A periods to serve any buyer type in F, the discount factor multiplying this
surplus is always greater than or equal to #^-1. Therefore, the sum of the discounted
surpluses that produces the present value V must be greater than the undiscounted
sum of these surpluses, St, multiplied by the discount factor #A1. This is what
equation (A.13) asserts.
Combining the inequalities in equations (A.12) and (A.13), we observe that for
any # satisfying equation (A.11) and any subset r containing two or more distinct
buyer types,
At = St - V1^". (A.9)
For any subset I containing two or more buyer types, At is strictly greater than
zero. For suppose that v, > v3 represent the marginal valuations of two buyer types
contained in the subset i and consider the strategy of a monopolist who cannot
make separate take-it-or-leave-it offers to each buyer. It is not possible for such a
+ > Sg . (A.14)
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Using equation (A.14) to substitute for St in equation (A.9) and recalling that
At > A demonstrates that for any subset r containing two or more distinct buyer
types and any #8 satisfying equation (A.11), the inequality in equation (A.8) must be
satisfied.
This completes the proof of lemma 1.
For any subset F, containing two or more distinct buyer types and any #G> 3 p,
lemma 1 can be used to rewrite equation (A.7) in the form:
VP _ Yr > 0 A-1)
" 2
Footnotes to the Appendix
1. The assumption that VA > c'(0) is sufficient to insure that all buyer types
would be served by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
2. The value Vr' can be written in a form that closely resembles the formula for
VP in equation (A.3). It is only necessary to renumber the buyer types in I so as
to delete those buyer types which are not represented in P. For this purpose define
a function ar(a) that maps the set {1, 2,... , A} to the set {1, 2,... ,A(F)}. If there
are no type a buyers in the set r, then ar(a) = 0. Otherwise, cr(ai) = 1 if a1 is the
buyer type in r with the highest marginal valuation for quality, ar(a2) = 2 if a2 is
the buyer type in P with the 2nd highest marginal valuation for quality, and so on.
Using the function ar to re-index the buyers in the subset 1, we can write the
following expression for Vr:
A(r)
Vr = /par- n r pra-
ar=1
(A.15)
Proceeding from left to right, the first inequality in equation (A.15) follows from
equation (A.8) and lemma 1. The second inequality follows from the definition of PP
in equation (A.11) and the assumption that # > fPp. The final inequality in equation
(A.15) follows from i. the definition of W_ which implies that S > #3W;_ and ii. the
observation that A > A(F,).
This completes the proof of proposition 1.
Proposition 1 has the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For any finite initial set of buyers and any discount factor 1 > Q1> f'p
with Pp = 0 if the initial set of buyers contains only one type and with Pp otherwise
given in equation (A.11), the use of the Pacman strategy by the monopolist and the
get-it-while-you-can strategy by each buyer constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the infinite-horizon, complete-information market game.
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